Posted by
whoyg1648 on Wednesday, October 28, 2009 5:21:42 AM
The publication of protocols from sessions of the Chinese Communist
Party Politburo's standing committee – held during the events of
Tiananmen Square in 1989 – caused no more than a one-day sensation in
the West and passed virtually unnoticed in Russia. This is despite the
fact that the protocols provide a rare glimpse into the psychology of
the Forbidden City's most secretive inhabitants.
Of the five
members of the standing committee, the majority (three members) opposed
the use of force and favored a compromise with the students. Deng
Xiaoping, China's leader at the time, though he didn't hold any
official post, was undecided, and only the iron Li Peng, after getting
the elderly military advisors into wholesale pearl jewelry wholesale pearl jewelry action, pushed successfully for
ruthless suppression of the demonstrations.
Reading these
protocols is just further proof that, though in retrospect, history
looks like a logical chain of determined events, it is, in fact, a
cemetery of lost opportunities.
Liberal values (not the
Pinochet-style liberalism currently fashionable in Russia, but
liberalism in the sense of respect for the value of human life) was
part of the Chinese ruling class' mentality in 1989, and its supporters
had some chance of success.
Let's remember this important circumstance and move now to another continent and another decade.
The
Balkans. May 1999. NATO's military operations in Kosovo had run up
against a dead end. No matter how "precise" the bombing, it unavoidably
led to increasing "collateral damage," that is to say, the death of
civilians, which in turn saw European public support for the operations
take a tumble.
At the same time, NATO was not ready to commit
itself to a ground operation at the risk of splitting the alliance and
facing public humiliation. This is because modern Western society,
especially American society, is simply not willing to accept military
casualties, at least, not in a war that doesn't threaten its existence.
This
Western unwillingness to accept the casualties of war, not only among
its own troops, but also among the opposing side's civilians, is a
historically new phenomenon. Twenty-five years ago, the Americans were
losing tens of thousands of soldiers in Vietnam.
And no one was
particularly concerned when hundreds of thousands of civilians died in
the bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima in 1945. (Likewise, modern
Russian society, which finds itself at another point on the historical
timescale, is completely indifferent to Keishi pearl the loss of thousands of its
soldiers, and all the more so to the deaths of tens of thousands of
civilians in Chechnya.)
The main lesson of the Kosovo operation,
a lesson of substance rather than propaganda, is that the modern,
democratic, satiated, hedonistic, post-industrial West is not a
military threat to Russia.
But what about the East? If by some
twist of circumstances China becomes our military opponent, it would be
a definitely superior opponent in terms of conventional forces. China
has huge troop reserves and is rearming its armed forces at rapid
speed, including with Russia's help. But can Russia's nuclear arsenal –
as the country's official military doctrine supposes – act as a
deterrent and neutralize China's advantages as a potential opponent?
A
decisive factor in nuclear strategy is not just the number of warheads
a country possesses, but also the extent to which its political
leadership is prepared to accept millions of casualties. This in turn
depends on the value a given culture accords the individual human life.
During the conflict between China and Vietnam in the 1980s, the
Chinese used a tactic known as "living wave" attacks and lost thousands
of soldiers every day in these advances. If the value of a single human
life hasn't changed since then in Chinese society, Russia will have to
give up its illusions that the threat to use tactical nuclear weapons
would be enough to hold back China's superior conventional forces.
This
means that the only long-term, and essentially the only possible
guarantee for Russia's security is political and ideological change
that would bring China closer to playground equipment democracy and the foundation of basic
human values – the value of an individual human life, something much
despised both by communist and more recent strong-state propaganda.
This
is why the Beijing protocols contain many lessons not just for
historians, but also for futurologists. They offer hope that the first
shoots of change crushed by the tanks in 1989 will yet be able to take
root in Chinese soil.
(Andrei Piontkovsky is director of the Center for Strategic Research.)